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PLAINTIFF FELL AT HER NURSING HOME AND EMERGENCY PERSONNEL FOUND HER UNATTENDED ON THE FLOOR WITH NO IDENTIFICATION BAND; DEFENDANT’S EXPERT, A CARDIAC CRITICAL CARE PHYSICIAN, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FAMILIARITY WITH NURSING HOME CARE AND DID NOT ADDRESS ALL THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE PLEADINGS; SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this medical malpractice/Public Health Law 2801-d action should not have been granted. The defendant relied on the expert opinion of a physician who did not demonstrate familiarity with nursing home care and did not address the allegations that plaintiff’s decedent was left unattended on the floor after she fell and defendant’s personnel did not cooperate with the EMS personnel who attended the decedent:

“On a motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in a medical malpractice action, a defendant must make a prima facie showing either that there was no departure from good and accepted medical practice, or that the plaintiff was not injured by any such departure” … . “In order to sustain this prima facie burden, the defendant must address and rebut any specific allegations of malpractice set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint and bill of particulars” … .

“Liability under the Public Health Law contemplates injury to the patient caused by the deprivation of a right conferred by contract, statute, regulation, code or rule, subject to the defense that the facility exercised all care reasonably necessary to prevent and limit the deprivation and injury to the patient. …

… [W]here a physician opines outside his or her area of specialization, a foundation must be laid tending to support the reliability of the opinion rendered” … . …

… [T]he defendant relied on an expert affirmation of a physician who engaged in, inter alia, the practice of cardiac critical care. This affirmation did not indicate that the physician had training in geriatric or nursing home care or what, if anything, the physician did to become familiar with the standard of care for these specialties … . … [T]he defendant’s expert failed to specifically address the allegations that the defendant’s staff members left the decedent on the floor unattended while awaiting the arrival of EMS and failed to cooperate with EMS personnel upon their arrival … . … [T]he EMS report reflected that the defendant failed to provide EMS personnel with more than mere transfer paperwork. … [T]he decedent initially could not be identified because she did not have an identification band, and EMS personnel did not know whether the patient was on blood thinners or subject to any “advance directives.” Deitch v Sands Point Ctr. for Health & Rehabilitation, 2025 NY Slip Op 02317, Second Dept 4-23-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a clear explanation of the very different nature of a medical malpractice action as compared with a Public Health Law 2801-d action.

Practice Point: Here plaintiff’s decedent fell at her nursing home. Defendant’s expert, a cardiac physician, did not demonstrate any familiarity with nursing home care, rendering his affidavit insufficient.

Practice Point: In a medical malpractice/Public Health Law 2801-d action, the expert’s failure to address all the allegations in the pleadings renders the expert evidence insufficient.

 

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