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THE OFFICER’S TESTIMONY HE COULD NOT SEE INSIDE THE CAR FROM A DISTANCE OF 10 TO 15 FEET PROVIDED PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP THE CAR FOR A “TINTED WINDOWS” VIOLATION; THE DISSENT ARGUED IT WAS DARK AT THE TIME OF THE STOP AND THE OFFICER DID NOT LINK HIS INABILITY TO SEE INSIDE THE CAR TO THE TINTED WINDOWS AS OPPOSED TO THE AMBIENT DARKNESS (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, affirming County Court, over a dissent, determined the officer’s testimony he could not see the driver’s face from a distance of 10 to 15 feet demonstrated probable cause of a “tinted window” violation which supported the vehicle stop. The dissent argued the officer’s testimony was insufficient to demonstrate probable cause because it was dark at the time of the stop and the officer did not link his inability to see inside the car to the tinted windows, as opposed to the ambient darkness:

Here, the officer who initiated the stop testified at the suppression hearing that he looked directly at the driver’s side window of the vehicle defendant was operating, that he did so from a distance of no more than 10 to 15 feet, and that he was “unable to see the driver of the vehicle” through the window. We conclude that the officer’s testimony contained sufficient facts to establish that he reasonably believed that the windows were excessively tinted in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) (2) … .

From the dissent:

The officer who attempted to initiate the stop of defendant’s vehicle testified that he believed any level of tint on the front driver’s side window or the front passenger window would be illegal and that the actual tint on the vehicle’s windows was never tested with a tint meter. He further testified that he initially observed the vehicle when it was dark outside and that he was unable to see the driver inside the vehicle. At no point did the officer testify that it was the window tint, as opposed to the ambient darkness, that prevented him from seeing the driver. The officer’s failure to link the allegedly excessive tint with his inability to see into the vehicle distinguishes this case from those cited by the majority, in which the arresting officer “testified at the suppression hearing that he could tell the window tints were too dark because he could not see into the [vehicle]” … or “specifically testified that the driver’s side windows were ‘so dark that [he] was unable to actually see the operator of the vehicle as the vehicle was going by’ ” … . Because the officer’s testimony here failed to link his conclusory belief that the windows were excessively tinted with an objective fact in support of that belief, I conclude that the People failed to meet their burden … . People v Hall, 2025 NY Slip Op 01457, Fourth Dept 3-14-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for some insight into the proof required for a valid “tinted-windows-violation” traffic stop.

 

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