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THE MOTION COURT IN THIS REAR-END TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE CERTIFIED BUT UNSIGNED DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANT; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL OF THE CROSS-CLAIMS (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion court should have considered the deposition transcripts, which were certified but unsigned, and should have granted defendant driver’s (Jara Mejia’s) motions for summary judgment and dismissal of the cross-claims. Jara Mejia’s car was stopped when it was struck from behind:

“A defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident” … . In support of his motion, Jara Mejia submitted, inter alia, a transcript of his deposition testimony and transcripts of the deposition testimony of the plaintiffs, Tsering, and Cruz Arce. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, Jara Mejia’s unsigned but certified deposition transcript was admissible, “since the transcript was submitted by the party deponent himself and, therefore, was adopted as accurate by the deponent” … . In addition, while the remaining deposition transcripts were also unsigned, they were certified and their accuracy was not challenged … . Thus, the deposition transcripts were admissible and should have been considered by the court on Jara Mejia’s motion. Gironza v Macedonio, 2024 NY Slip Op 04306, Second Dept 8-28-24

Practice Point: Certified but unsigned deposition transcripts are admissible in support of summary judgment when submitted by the party deponent himself.

Practice Point: Certified but unsigned deposition transcripts are admissible in support of summary judgment when their accuracy is not challenged.

 

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