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THE DOCTRINE OF THE LAW OF THE CASE PRECLUDED CONSIDERATION OF WHETHER THE BANK COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304; THE ISSUE HAD BEEN DETERMINED IN THE BANK’S FAVOR AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RECONSIDERED, SUA SPONTE, WHEN THE BANK MOVED FOR A JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the doctrine of the law of the case precluded the court from sua sponte, considering whether the notice requirements of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1304 were met by the bank in this foreclosure action. The issue was determined in the bank’s favor in the initial summary judgment proceeding and should not have been considered again when the bank moved to confirm the referee’s report and for a judgment of foreclosure:

… [T]he defendants raised the issue of noncompliance with RPAPL 1304 in their answer, the plaintiff presented evidence of its compliance with the statute on its motion, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint, and, in granting that motion, the Supreme Court decided the issue in the plaintiff’s favor. Therefore, pursuant to the doctrine of law of the case … , the court was precluded from reconsidering the issue on the plaintiff’s motion to confirm the referee’s report and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale … . Moreover, since the defendants did not oppose the plaintiff’s motion to confirm the referee’s report and, therefore, did not raise the issue of the plaintiff’s noncompliance with RPAPL 1304 in opposition to the motion, the court should not have raised the issue sua sponte … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Morales, 2019 NY Slip Op 08891, Second Dept 12-11-19

 

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