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PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF AN ACCIDENT INVOLVING HER GOLF CART AND A MOTOR VEHICLE IN THE COUNTY GOLF COURSE PARKING LOT; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the assumption of the risk doctrine applied to the operation of a golf cart in the parking lot of a golf course. Defendant county, the owner of the golf course, was therefore not liable for an accident involving a motor vehicle in the parking lot:

… [T]he County defendants met their burden of establishing that the risk of being injured while driving a golf cart is “inherent in the sport” of golf and that plaintiff was aware of the risk and assumed it … , and that plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact with respect thereto … . At the time of the accident, plaintiff was an experienced golfer who played the golf course regularly throughout the season … . Moreover, the County defendants demonstrated that plaintiff had routinely driven a golf cart into the parking lot to retrieve her clubs from her vehicle, and that she was aware of the fact that other people would be operating motor vehicles in the parking lot. The County defendants therefore established as a matter of law that being injured while driving a golf cart in the parking lot of the golf course before a round of golf is “within the known, apparent and foreseeable dangers of the sport” of golf … . Galante v Karlis, 2024 NY Slip Op 04001, Fourth Dept 7-26-24

Practice Point: Here, over a two-justice dissent, plaintiff was deemed to have assumed the risk of a golf-cart/motor vehicle accident in the golf course parking lot.

 

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