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DEFENDANT, WHO CO-OWNED THE PROPERTY FOR A TWO-YEAR PERIOD, DEMONSTRATED HE DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE HAZARDOUS LEAD PAINT CONDITION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this lead-paint exposure case should have been granted. Defendant was a co-owner of the subject property but he was able to demonstrate his connection to the property was such that he did not have actual or constructive notice of the hazardous lead paint condition:

… [D]efendant owned the subject property, as a tenant in common, with his father during the period of plaintiffs’ tenancy from 1992 to 1994. In support of his motions, defendant submitted his affidavit, wherein he averred, among other things, that he was a co-owner of the property “on paper only,” that his father handled all day-to-day maintenance of the property, and that defendant never entered plaintiffs’ apartments or hired anyone to make repairs thereto during plaintiffs’ tenancy. Defendant further averred that he did not have a key to the apartments and that he never spoke to or received complaints from plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ mother. Defendant’s submissions also established that he had no knowledge of inspections for or the existence of lead paint at the property during plaintiffs’ tenancy and that he was unaware that the property was constructed at a time before lead paint was banned, that paint was peeling at the property, that lead paint posed a danger to young children, and that young children lived on the property.

Regardless of whether defendant’s father had actual or constructive notice through his own involvement with the property, that notice cannot be imputed to defendant absent evidence of defendant’s own actual or constructive notice … . McDowell v Maldovan, 2020 NY Slip Op 01748, Fourth Dept 3-13-20

 

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