You are here: / / DEFENDANT, WHO CO-OWNED THE PROPERTY FOR A TWO-YEAR PERIOD, DEMONSTRATED...
,

DEFENDANT, WHO CO-OWNED THE PROPERTY FOR A TWO-YEAR PERIOD, DEMONSTRATED HE DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE HAZARDOUS LEAD PAINT CONDITION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this lead-paint exposure case should have been granted. Defendant was a co-owner of the subject property but he was able to demonstrate his connection to the property was such that he did not have actual or constructive notice of the hazardous lead paint condition:

… [D]efendant owned the subject property, as a tenant in common, with his father during the period of plaintiffs’ tenancy from 1992 to 1994. In support of his motions, defendant submitted his affidavit, wherein he averred, among other things, that he was a co-owner of the property “on paper only,” that his father handled all day-to-day maintenance of the property, and that defendant never entered plaintiffs’ apartments or hired anyone to make repairs thereto during plaintiffs’ tenancy. Defendant further averred that he did not have a key to the apartments and that he never spoke to or received complaints from plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ mother. Defendant’s submissions also established that he had no knowledge of inspections for or the existence of lead paint at the property during plaintiffs’ tenancy and that he was unaware that the property was constructed at a time before lead paint was banned, that paint was peeling at the property, that lead paint posed a danger to young children, and that young children lived on the property.

Regardless of whether defendant’s father had actual or constructive notice through his own involvement with the property, that notice cannot be imputed to defendant absent evidence of defendant’s own actual or constructive notice … . McDowell v Maldovan, 2020 NY Slip Op 01748, Fourth Dept 3-13-20

 

You might also like
TOWN DID NOT TAKE THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK AT THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALMART STORE, NEGATIVE DECLARATION ANNULLED.
THE GRAND JURY EVIDENCE OF TWO LACERATIONS ON THE VICTIM’S NECK, 3-4 AND 5-6 CENTIMETERS LONG, SUPPORTED THE TWO COUNTS OF FIRST DEGREE ASSAULT BASED UPON DISFIGUREMENT (FOURTH DEPT).
AN OFFICER’S OBSERVATION OF DEFENDANT’S CAR FOLLOWING ANOTHER CAR TOO CLOSELY (A TRAFFIC INFRACTION) PROVIDED PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A TRAFFIC STOP, EVEN IF THERE WERE OTHER MOTIVATIONS FOR THE STOP (FOURTH DEPT).
COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT WRITTEN BY DEFENDANT CONCERNING PLAINTIFF, A DOCTOR WHOSE PATIENT DIED DURING SURGERY, WAS PROTECTED BY THE COMMON INTEREST QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE AND WAS AN EXPRESSION OF PURE OPINION (FOURTH DEPT).
Grand Jury Proceedings Not Rendered Defective by Prosecutor’s Introduction of New Evidence After First True Bill Voted
MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT).
IN A MANDAMUS PROCEEDING WHICH IS TRIGGERED BY A DEMAND BY PETITIONER, AN UNREASONABLE DELAY IN MAKING THE DEMAND WILL RENDER THE PROCEEDING TIME-BARRED (FOURTH DEPT).
SUPREME COURT PROPERLY CONSOLIDATED TWO INDICTMENTS, CRITERIA EXPLAINED; THERE WAS A COMPREHENSIVE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

WHERE THERE IS A DISCREPANCY THE ORDER MUST BE CONFORMED WITH THE DECISION (FOURTH... CONTRARY TO SUPREME COURT’S RULING, THE PURCHASE CONTRACT DID NOT INCLUDE...