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PLAINTIFF, IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT SEXUAL ABUSE ACTION, PROPERLY ASSERTED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS, CRITERIA EXPLAINED IN DEPTH (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Higgitt, determined the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) cause of action should not have been dismissed in this Child Victims Act sexual abuse case. Supreme Court held the IIED cause of action duplicated negligence causes of action. It was alleged that an employee of defendant church who coached a basketball team abused plaintiff, one of the players:

… [P]laintiff is asserting the IIED cause of action as an alternative claim to his negligence claims.

Thus … plaintiff is not barred from pursuing a cause of action for IIED.

… [T]he complaint states a cause of action for IIED. … [P]laintiff pleaded that defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct.

… [P]laintiff alleged that defendant knowingly permitted its employee, a child molester, to coach its youth basketball team, and defendant turned a blind eye to the abuse, allowing the employee to repeatedly subject plaintiff to inappropriate sexual contact. In doing so, defendant abused a position of dominance. Defendant, a trusted institution, enjoyed a position of dominance over plaintiff, a then-adolescent, who wanted to play on a prestigious youth basketball program that the church administered. Additionally, plaintiff, an adolescent coached by a church deacon, was especially vulnerable. Plaintiff’s vulnerability is highlighted by the allegations that defendant’s employee was permitted by defendant to be alone with plaintiff in a locker room where the sexual contact occurred. And defendant’s undesirable conduct was continuing; defendant retained and supervised the coach over the two-year period of abuse.

Crediting plaintiff’s allegations, … defendant facilitated manifestly inappropriate physical contact of a sexual nature by a known child molester by allowing him to coach its youth basketball team and providing the coach with ready access to potential child victims. That conduct … goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society …  We believe that an average member of the community would, upon reading the allegations in the complaint, find them to be outrageous … . Brown v Riverside Church in the City of N.Y., 2024 NY Slip Op 03927, First Dept 7-25-24

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an explanation of when a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, in addition to negligence causes of action, is allowed.

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for the criteria for an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action.

 

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