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DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN “CLOSE PROXIMITY” TO THE DRUGS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE “ROOM” OR “DRUG FACTORY” PRESUMPTION; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s possession-of-drugs convictions and ordering a new trial, determined the “room” or “drug factory” presumption was not applicable:

… [S]ection 220.25 (2) provides that “[t]he presence of a narcotic drug . . . in open view in a room . . . under circumstances evincing an intent to unlawfully mix, compound, package or otherwise prepare for sale such controlled substance is presumptive evidence of knowing possession thereof by each and every person in close proximity to such controlled substance at the time such controlled substance was found.” “Penal statutes ‘must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law’ ” … . The drug factory presumption is “intended to allow police in the field to identify potentially culpable individuals involved in a drug business, under circumstances that demonstrate those individuals’ participation in a drug operation” … . According to its drafters, the presumption is “designed to remedy that situation wherein police execute a search warrant on a premises suspected of being a ‘drug factory,’ only to find dangerous drugs and/or drug paraphernalia scattered about the room. The occupants of such ‘factories,’ who moments before were diluting or packaging the drugs, usually proclaim their innocence and disclaim ownership of, or any connection with, the materials spread before them. Police, under such circumstances, are often uncertain as to whom to arrest. In addition, with the present burden of proof of knowing possession of dangerous drugs on the [P]eople, successful prosecution of persons other than the owner or lessee of such premises is extremely rare” … . …

… [T]he phrase “close proximity” in Penal Law § 220.25 (2) means “when the defendant is sufficiently near the drugs so as to evince defendant’s participation in an apparent drug sales operation, thus supporting a presumption of defendant’s knowing possession” … . “[T]he proximity determination requires careful consideration of the underlying facts related to defendant’s location on the premises” … . Thus, a defendant need not be apprehended within the same room as the drugs in order to satisfy the element of “close proximity” … , and the presumption applies to a defendant caught while trying to flee the premises upon the sudden entry by police … .  …

… [D]efendant was not apprehended in close proximity to the drugs as contemplated by the drug factory presumption, i.e., he was not “sufficiently near the drugs so as to evince defendant’s participation in an apparent drug sales operation, thus supporting a presumption of defendant’s knowing possession” … . Defendant was not apprehended in the room with the drugs, he was not apprehended fleeing from that room, and he was not apprehended within or outside of the home while attempting to hide from police. Thus, he was not apprehended under circumstances suggesting that he had, just “moments before,” been engaged in drug distillation or packaging … . People v Campbell, 2024 NY Slip Op 03995, Fourth Dept 7-26-24

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the “room” or “drug factory” presumption re: the possession of drugs.​

 

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