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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT HIS OWN LIABILTY; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DEEMED PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PREMATURE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this rear-end collision case, determined that although defendant raised a question of fact about whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent, defendant did not raise a question of fact about the defendant-driver’s liability. In addition, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should not have been deemed premature:

… [T]he defendants submitted an affidavit from the defendant driver, in which he stated that he was “not fully responsible” for the accident. The defendant driver also averred that the traffic light had turned green and that the plaintiff had moved forward and then suddenly stopped, causing the defendant driver to strike the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle despite his efforts to stop his vehicle. This evidence raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was comparatively at fault in the happening of the accident, thereby supporting the denial of that branch of her motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the affirmative defenses alleging comparative negligence … . However, since the defendants’ evidence related only to the plaintiff’s comparative fault, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging negligent operation of a motor vehicle … .

Furthermore, the Supreme Court erred in determining that the plaintiff’s motion was premature. “[W]hile a party is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery in advance of a summary judgment determination, [a] party contending that a summary judgment motion is premature must demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant” … . Here, the defendants had personal knowledge of the relevant facts, and their mere hope or speculation that evidence might be uncovered during discovery was an insufficient basis for denying the plaintiff’s motion …. Martin v Copado-Esquivel, 2024 NY Slip Op 01804, Second Dept 4-3-24

Practice Point: In a rear-end collision case, the fact that defendant raises a question of fact about plaintiff’s contributory negligence does not preclude granting plaintiff summary judgment on the issue of defendant’s liability.

Practice Point: Here, where the facts of the rear-end collision were within defendant’s personal knowledge, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should not have been dismissed as premature.

 

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