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Criteria for Common Law Negligence Re: Injury Caused by an Intoxicated Guest Explained

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s common law negligence cause of action was properly dismissed.  Plaintiff, upon leaving a party hosted by the defendants, was assaulted by three unidentified persons. The court explained the relevant common law criteria for finding a host negligent based upon the actions of an intoxicated guest:

Under a theory of common-law negligence, a landowner may have responsibility for injuries caused by an intoxicated guest …, although liability may be imposed only for injuries that occurred on a defendant’s property, or in an area under the defendant’s control, where the defendant had the opportunity to supervise the intoxicated guest and was reasonably aware of the need for such control …. “Without the requisite awareness [of the risk or threat] there is no duty” … . Colon v Pohl, 2014 NY Slip Op 07117, 2nd Dept 10-22-14

 

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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DENTIST WAS AN EMPLOYEE OR AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND WHETHER PLAINTIFF GAVE INFORMED CONSENT (THIRD DEPT).
UNLIKE THE GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (DRAM SHOP ACT) CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST A BAR WHICH SERVES A VISIBLY INTOXICATED PERSON WHO IS LATER INVOLVED IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, A COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION APPLIES ONLY TO INJURIES CAUSED BY AN INTOXICATED PERSON ON DEFENDANT’S PROPERTY OR IN AN AREA UNDER DEFENDANT’S CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CONTRACTORS WHICH DID SIDEWALK/GRATE WORK LAUNCHED AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE; THE CONTRACTORS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL ON SNOW FIVE HOURS AFTER THE “EXTRAORDINARY SNOWSTORM” HAD ENDED; THE STORM-IN-PROGRESS RULE APPLIED AND DEFENDANT TRANSIT AUTHORITY WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH FATHER HAD THE RIGHT TO WAIVE COUNSEL AND PROCEED PRO SE IN THIS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDING, FAMILY COURT PROPERLY REFUSED HIS UNTIMELY REQUEST (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A PROTECTIVE ORDER ALLOWING THE PEOPLE TO DELAY DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE IN THIS MURDER CASE UNTIL ONE WEEK BEFORE TRIAL; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE NOTICE BY PROOF WHICH MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, THEREFORE THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO ALLOW THE EX PARTE INTERVIEW OF THE NONPARTY TREATING PHYSICIAN’S ASSISTANT ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S EXPLANATION OF THE CAUSE OF HER SLIP AND FALL WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

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