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PROTECTIVE ORDER PRECLUDING DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE TO THE DEFENSE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a decision by Justice Scheinkman, reversing Supreme Court, vacated a protective order concerning the disclosure of certain evidence to the defense:

I agree with the defendant that the People should have been required to disclose to defense counsel the general nature of the information that the People sought to be protected (see CPL 245.10[1][a] [“Portions of materials claimed to be non-discoverable may be withheld pending a determination and ruling of the court under 245.70 of this article; but the defendant shall be notified in writing that information has not been disclosed under a particular subdivision of (CPL 245.20)”]).

The defendant and his counsel were not informed as to whether what was sought to be protected were only witness names and personal information as opposed to witness statements, police reports, grand jury testimony, video or audio recordings, or other evidence.

I also agree with the defendant that, under the circumstances of this case, the People should have been required to disclose information about the reasons for the application that would not reveal the existence of the information sought to be protected. As I stated in People v Bonifacio (179 AD3d 977, 979), “proceedings on applications for a protective order should be entirely ex parte only where the applicant has demonstrated the clear necessity for the entirety of the application, and the submissions in support of it, to be shielded from the opposing party” and that it may be that “even where some aspects of the application should be considered by the court ex parte, other portions of the application may be appropriately disclosable.” Here, much of the written application could have been disclosed to defense counsel in redacted form without any danger of revealing the information sought to be protected … . People v Belfon, 2020 NY Slip Op 01630, Second Dept 3-11-20

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