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ONLY CONTRACTORS AND OWNERS AND THEIR AGENTS CAN BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6); HERE DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED IT WAS NOT AN AGENT FOR ANY POTENTIALLY LIABLE PARTY BECAUSE IT EXERCISED NO SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE WORKSITE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action against one defendant (G Buddy) should have been dismissed because G Buddy had no control or supervisory duties at the worksite:

The express terms of Labor Law §§ 240 and 241(6) provide that “the nondelegable duties imposed by those statutes apply only to ‘contractors and owners and their agents'” … . “To hold a defendant liable as an agent of the general contractor or the owner for violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), there must be a showing that it had the authority to supervise and control the work that brought about the injury” … . Here, G Buddy established, prima facie, that it was not an agent of either the Board or the contractor at the time of the plaintiff’s accident by submitting evidence demonstrating that G Buddy had no control over or supervisory responsibilities on the worksite … . Hossain v Condominium Bd. of Grand Professional Bldg., 2023 NY Slip Op 06128, Second Dept 11-29-23

Practice Point: In order to hold a party liable under Labor Law 240(1) or 241(6) as an agent of a contractor or owner, the party must have exercised supervisory control over the worksite.

 

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