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THE RIGHT TO SEEK REMOVAL OF A CLOUD ON TITLE IS NEVER BARRED BY A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the causes of action which sought to remove a cloud on title should not have been dismissed as time-barred because the right to that relief is never barred by a statute of limitations:

Supreme Court erred in granting those branches of the defendants’ motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss as time-barred the first and second causes of action, which sought to set aside and cancel, as null and void, the two mortgages held by the defendants. The Trust, as the alleged owner of the subject property, is “presumptively entitled to possession” … , and the first and second causes of action seek to remove the cloud on title resulting from the allegedly fraudulent mortgages. “[W]here a plaintiff seeks to remove a cloud on title, the right to such relief ‘is never barred by the Statute of Limitations. It is a continuing right which exists as long as there is an occasion for its exercise'” … . Mostafa v Pension Solutions, LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 06134, Second Dept 11-29-30

Practice Point: The right to seek removal of a cloud on title is never barred by a statute of limitations.

 

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