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You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT START PROCEEDINGS TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN...
Civil Procedure, Foreclosure

PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT START PROCEEDINGS TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR AND DID NOT PRESENT AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY; THE MOTION TO DISIMISS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank in this foreclosure action did not seek a default judgment within one year and did not offer a reasonable excuse for the delay. Therefore there was no need for the court to consider whether plaintiff had a meritorious cause of action. The complaint should have been dismissed:

CPLR 3215(c) provides that “[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after [a] default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed.” “The language of CPLR 3215(c) is not, in the first instance, discretionary, but mandatory, inasmuch as courts ‘shall’ dismiss claims (CPLR 3215[c]) for which default judgments are not sought within the requisite one-year period, as those claims are then deemed abandoned” … . …

… [T]his matter was released from the settlement conference part in December 2011, and that the plaintiff failed to take steps to initiate proceedings for the entry of a default judgment by moving for leave to enter a default judgment and for an order of reference until March 2013, “which was too late for the plaintiff to ‘manifest an intent not to abandon the case'” … . … [Plaintiff] offered only vague, conclusory, and unsubstantiated assertions which were insufficient to excuse the plaintiff’s delay in moving for leave to enter a default judgment … .

Since [plaintiff] failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for the plaintiff’s delay, this Court need not consider whether the plaintiff had a potentially meritorious cause of action … . Citimortgage, Inc. v Kimmerling, 2023 NY Slip Op 05246, Second Dept 10-18-23

Practice Point: Pursuant to CPLR 3215(c). if the plaintiff does not start proceedings to enter a default judgment within a year and does not offer an adequate excuse for the delay, the complaint must be dismissed. There is no need for the court to consider whether plaintiff has a meritorious cause of action.

 

October 18, 2023
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-10-18 08:53:192023-10-21 09:14:00PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT START PROCEEDINGS TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR AND DID NOT PRESENT AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY; THE MOTION TO DISIMISS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
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