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A NYC REGULATION REQUIRES FOR-HIRE VEHICLES TO BE WITHIN 12 INCHES OF THE CURB WHEN PICKING UP OR DISCHARGING PASSENGERS; THE DRIVER STOPPED TWO FEET FROM THE CURB AND PLAINTIFF FELL TRYING TO GET INTO THE VEHICLE; THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST THE UBER DRIVER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the negligence action against the driver and owner of an UBER vehicle should not have been dismissed. The driver stopped two feet from the curb and plaintiff tripped trying to get into the vehicle. A NYC regulation requires vehicles-for-hire to be within 12 inches of the curb:

“To hold a defendant liable in common-law negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) that the breach constituted a proximate cause of the injury” …   “Although the issue of proximate cause is generally one for the finder of fact, liability may not be imposed upon a party who merely furnishes the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the event but is not one of its causes” … .

“A common carrier owes a duty to a passenger to provide a reasonably safe place to board and disembark its vehicle” … . 34 RCNY 4-11(c) requires taxis and for-hire vehicles to be within 12 inches of the curb when picking up or discharging passengers. Porcasi v Oji, 2023 NY Slip Op 05281, Second Dept 10-18-23

Practice Point: Here the NYC regulation requiring for-hire vehicle to be within 12 inches of the curb when picking up a passenger created a duty on the part of the driver which was breached when the driver stopped two-feet from the curb. The defendant driver did not demonstrate the breach was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s fall and did not demonstrate the driver’s action merely furnished a condition for the fall. Therefore there are questions of fact for the jury.

 

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