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You are here: Home1 / Insurance Law2 / THE POLICE OFFICER INJURED IN THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT AND THE CITY SEEKING...
Insurance Law, Municipal Law, Negligence

THE POLICE OFFICER INJURED IN THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT AND THE CITY SEEKING RECOVERY OF PAYMENTS MADE STEMMING FROM THE OFFICER’S INJURY MUST SHARE THE $100,000 “PER PERSON” INSURANCE-POLICY LIMIT (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the police officer injured in a car accident and the city suing for payments made for the officer’s salary and medical expenses had to share the $100,000 “per person”  policy-limit in the Safeco insurance policy:

… [T]here is a $100,000 policy limit for “each person” sustaining bodily injury. The policy provides that the limit of bodily injury liability for “each person” is the “maximum limit of liability for all damages, including damages for care, loss of services or death, resulting from any one auto accident” for bodily injury not resulting in death of “any one person” (emphasis added). The City here asserted a claim against the tortfeasors pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c (6), which creates a cause of action for municipalities for reimbursement of “such sum or sums actually paid as salary or wages and or for medical treatment and hospital care as against any third party against whom the police officer shall have a cause of action for the injury sustained or sickness caused by such third party.” The municipality’s right to recover “is derived from its insured employee’s cause of action in negligence against the person causing such injury,” and the “right to bring the direct action is bottomed on the employee’s cause of action in negligence” … . … [T]he City’s statutory claim and plaintiff’s claim both result from the injuries sustained by plaintiff and are both included in the same $100,000 per person limit of liability in the policy … . Lewczyk v Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2023 NY Slip Op 04867, Fourth Dept 9-29-23

Practice Point: Here, pursuant to the unambiguous terms of the insurance policy, the police officer injured in a traffic accident and the city seeking recovery of the related salary and medical-expense payments must share the $100,000 “per person” insurance-policy limit.

 

September 29, 2023
Tags: Fourth Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2023-09-29 10:12:342023-09-30 10:33:37THE POLICE OFFICER INJURED IN THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT AND THE CITY SEEKING RECOVERY OF PAYMENTS MADE STEMMING FROM THE OFFICER’S INJURY MUST SHARE THE $100,000 “PER PERSON” INSURANCE-POLICY LIMIT (FOURTH DEPT). ​
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