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A COURT DOES NOT LOSE JURISDICTION OVER SENTENCING A DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 390.30 IF MORE THAN A YEAR ELAPSES BETWEEN CONVICTION AND SENTENCING (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined County Court did not lose jurisdiction to sentence defendant because more than a year elapsed between conviction and sentencing:

CPL 390.30 provides in relevant part that, “[i]n any case where the court determines that a defendant is eligible for a sentence of probation, the court, after consultation with the prosecutor and upon the consent of the defendant, may adjourn the sentencing to a specified date and order that the defendant be placed on interim probation supervision. In no event may the sentencing be adjourned for a period exceeding one year from the date the conviction is entered, except that upon good cause shown, the court may, upon the defendant’s consent, extend the period for an additional one year where the defendant has agreed to and is still participating in a substance abuse treatment program in connection with a . . . drug court” … . … [N]othing in CPL 390.30 (6) (a) states that a failure to sentence a defendant within one year of the date of conviction is a jurisdictional defect or that sentencing after that one-year period is prohibited … . People v Bryant, 2023 NY Slip Op 04857, Fourth Dept 9-29-23

Practice Point: CPL 390.30 does not deprive the sentencing court of jurisdiction if more than a year elapses between conviction and sentencing.

 

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