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PRIME CONTRACTOR DID NOT CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DID NOT SUPERVISE PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND DID NOT HAVE CONTROL OVER THE WORKSITE, ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 241 (6) 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this Labor law 241 (6), 200 and common law negligence action should have been granted. Plaintiff was struck by a car while working in the median of a highway. Defendant, Oakgrove, was a prime contractor with whom the injured plaintiff’s employer did not contract. And Oakgrove had no supervisory control over the plaintiff or the worksite:

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“The owner or general contractor is not synonymous with the prime contractor . . . Generally speaking, the prime contractor for general construction (especially in State construction projects) has no authority over the other prime contractors . . . unless the prime contractor is delegated work in such a manner that it stands in the shoes of the owner or general contractor with the authority to supervise and control the work” … .

Here, Oakgrove and Foit-Albert were both prime contractors, and plaintiff’s employer contracted only with Foit-Albert. Oakgrove did not supervise or instruct plaintiff. Rather, plaintiff reported to a supervisor at Foit-Albert. Oakgrove established as a matter of law that it had no control over plaintiff or the work he was performing, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact … . …

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… Oakgrove … established that it did not have control over the work site at the time of plaintiff’s accident …. Thus, the court should have dismissed the Labor Law § 200 claim and common-law negligence cause of action … . Knab v Robertson, 2017 NY Slip Op 07822, Fourth Department 11-9-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PRIME CONTRACTOR DID NOT CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DID NOT SUPERVISE PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND DID NOT HAVE CONTROL OVER THE WORKSITE, ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 241 (6) 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))/PRIME CONTRACTOR (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PRIME CONTRACTOR DID NOT CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DID NOT SUPERVISE PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND DID NOT HAVE CONTROL OVER THE WORKSITE, ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 241 (6) 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PRIME CONTRACTOR DID NOT CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, DID NOT SUPERVISE PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND DID NOT HAVE CONTROL OVER THE WORKSITE, ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS LABOR LAW 241 (6) 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))

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