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THE MURDER SECOND DEGREE COUNTS MUST BE DISMISSED AS INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS OF THE MURDER FIRST DEGREE CONVICTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, affirming defendant’s convictions in this arson-murder case, noted that the two murder second degree counts were conclusory concurrent counts of the murder first degree count and must be dismissed:

… [T]he judgment must be modified, as the two counts of murder in the second degree upon which defendant was convicted are inclusory concurrent counts of the count of murder in the first degree, upon which he was also convicted (see CPL 300.40 [3] [b]). We therefore reverse his convictions for murder in the second degree and dismiss the corresponding counts in the indictment … . People v Truitt, 2023 NY Slip Op 01028, Third Dept 2-23-23

Practice Point: Here the murder second degree counts were dismissed as inclusory concurrent counts of murder first degree.

 

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