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PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM IN THIS PEDESTRIAN HIT-AND-RUN ACTION WAS NOT AUTOMATICALLY ASSIGNED TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION WHEN PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED A SETTLEMENT; PLAINTIFF’S ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT TAXICAB COMPANY AND THE DRIVERS WHO WERE ON DUTY WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff’s acceptance of a settlement from the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) did not automatically assign plaintiff’s claim to the MVAIC. Therefore plaintiff’s action against a taxi company and eight drivers who were on duty when plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck by a taxicab, should not have been dismissed. It was a hit-and-run accident and plaintiff had not yet identified the driver:

Insurance Law § 5213(b) provides: “As a condition to the payment of the amount of the settlement the qualified person . . . shall assign his claim to the corporation which shall then be subrogated to all of the rights of the qualified person against the financially irresponsible motorist.” Thus, the statute provides that, upon payment of the settlement amount by MVAIC, the “qualified person,” i.e., the plaintiff, shall assign his personal injury claim to MVAIC. …”[T]he text does not say that acceptance of payment operates as an assignment by operation of law; neither does it make execution of an assignment a condition precedent to the receipt of payment. Rather, the statute obligates an individual who receives payment to assign her claim to MVAIC, giving MVAIC the enforceable right to obtain such assignment.” Thus, although the plain language of Insurance Law § 5213(b) requires the plaintiff to assign his claim to MVAIC as a condition of receiving a settlement from MVAIC, such language does not make the assignment automatic. * * *

… MVAIC … chose not to take an assignment from the plaintiff, but rather rely upon the plaintiff’s reimbursement from any damages award he receives as a result of the instant action. MVAIC’s determination as to how best to proceed to recoup the amount it paid to the plaintiff in settlement, while also being assured that the plaintiff was pursuing an action against a potential financially irresponsible driver, was within the broad powers granted to MVAIC, and was consistent with the purpose of the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation Act. Archer v Beach Car Serv., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 01138, Second Dept 2-19-20

 

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