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ANY CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE INSURER WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S CLOSING OF ITS BUSINESS AFTER INCURRING WATER DAMAGE, THEREFORE THE INSURER WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE LOSS OF BUSINESS CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the insurer was entitled to summary judgment because, notwithstanding the way the insurer handled the water damage claim, the insurer’s actions were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s closing of its business:

Consequential damages are damages that do not directly flow from a breach of contract … . Proximate cause is an essential element of a breach of contract cause of action … . “[E]very contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” … . In an insurance contract context, consequential damages resulting from a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be asserted, “so long as the damages were within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of a breach at the time of or prior to contracting” … . “Consequential damages, designed to compensate a party for reasonably foreseeable damages, must be proximately caused by the breach” … Generally, it is for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause. However, the issue of proximate cause may be decided as a matter of law where only one conclusion may be drawn from the established fact … .

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that their alleged injurious conduct in handling the plaintiff’s claim was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s loss of business. It was undisputed that the stop work order issued shortly after the water leak, for reasons unrelated to the defendants, prevented the plaintiff from securing the necessary work permits prior to ceasing operations permanently. Lola Roberts Beauty Salon, Inc. v Leading Ins. Group Ins. Co., Ltd., 2018 NY Slip Op 02605, Second Dept 4-18-18​

​INSURANCE LAW (ANY CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE INSURER WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S CLOSING OF ITS BUSINESS AFTER INCURRING WATER DAMAGE, THEREFORE THE INSURER WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE LOSS OF BUSINESS CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (INSURANCE LAW, CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, ANY CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE INSURER WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S CLOSING OF ITS BUSINESS AFTER INCURRING WATER DAMAGE, THEREFORE THE INSURER WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE LOSS OF BUSINESS CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT))/CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INSURANCE LAW, LOSS OF BUSINESS, PROXIMATE CAUSE, ANY CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE INSURER WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S CLOSING OF ITS BUSINESS AFTER INCURRING WATER DAMAGE, THEREFORE THE INSURER WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE LOSS OF BUSINESS CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT))/DAMAGES (CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INSURANCE LAW, LOSS OF BUSINESS, ANY CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE INSURER WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S CLOSING OF ITS BUSINESS AFTER INCURRING WATER DAMAGE, THEREFORE THE INSURER WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE LOSS OF BUSINESS CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (SECOND DEPT))

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