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GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE ANY SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND THEREFORE WAS NOT LIABLE FOR AN INJURY ARISING FROM THE MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK FOR A SUBCONTRACTOR; LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Labor Law 200 action against the general contractor, El Sol. should have been dismissed. The accident involved the manner in which the work was done, not a dangerous condition. Plaintiff was employed by a subcontractor. Because El Sol did not exercise any supervisory control over plaintiff’s work, El Sol was not liable:

“Cases involving Labor Law § 200 fall into two broad categories: namely, those where workers are injured as a result of dangerous or defective premises conditions at a work site, and those involving the manner in which the work is performed” … . Where “a claim arises out of alleged defects or dangers arising from a subcontractor’s methods or materials, recovery against the owner or general contractor cannot be had unless it is shown that the party to be charged exercised some supervisory control over the operation” … . “A defendant has the authority to supervise or control the work for purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed” … . “[M]ere general supervisory authority at a work site for the purpose of overseeing the progress of the work and inspecting the work product is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200” … .

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, El Sol established, prima facie, that the accident did not arise from a dangerous or defective premises condition but from the method and manner of the work … . El Sol further established that it did not exercise supervision or control over the performance of the work giving rise to the accident … . Boody v El Sol Contr. & Constr. Corp., 2020 NY Slip Op 01140, Second Dept 2-19-20

 

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