You are here: / / ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL OF APPLICATION TO RENEW A VARIANCE PREVIOUSLY...

ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL OF APPLICATION TO RENEW A VARIANCE PREVIOUSLY ALLOWED WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the zoning board of appeals (ZBA) did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied petitioner’s application to renew a variance previously granted by the board. The Second Department held the board had adequately explained the reasons for the denial:

Where “a zoning board is [considering] an application that is substantially similar to a prior application that had been previously determined, the zoning board is required to provide a rational explanation for reaching a different result” … . “Where, however, a zoning board provides a rational explanation for reaching a different result on similar facts, the determination will not be viewed as either arbitrary or capricious” … . The zoning board “may refuse to duplicate previous error; it may change its views as to what is for the best interests of the [Town]; [or] it may give weight to slight differences which are not easily discernable” … .

The ZBA’s determination denying the petitioner’s applications to renew the use variance previously issued in 2007, and for a new use variance, was not illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion. With respect to renewal of the 2007 variance, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the ZBA’s findings of fact dated December 4, 2013, provided a rational basis for denying the petitioner’s application. The ZBA found, among other things, that the petitioner failed to demonstrate “unnecessary hardship” in accordance with Town Law § 267-b(2)(b). The fact that the ZBA previously temporarily approved the same application in 2007 did not relieve the petitioner of its evidentiary burdens in demonstrating “unnecessary hardship” for purposes of renewal of the use variance, or for purposes of seeking an additional use variance. As the ZBA determined, the petitioner failed to show, based on competent financial evidence, i.e., by dollars and cents proof, that it cannot yield a reasonable rate of return absent the requested use variances … . Matter of Monte Carlo 1, LLC v Weiss, 2016 NY Slip Op 06217, 2nd Dept 9-28-16

ZONING (ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL OF APPLICATION TO RENEW A VARIANCE PREVIOUSLY ALLOWED WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS)/VARIANCE (ZONING BOARD’S DENIAL OF APPLICATION TO RENEW A VARIANCE PREVIOUSLY ALLOWED WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS)

You might also like
IN THIS SIDEWAIK ICE-AND-SNOW SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE MUNICIPALITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE CONDITION, AND THE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THEY DID NOT CREATE THE CONDITION (SECOND DEPT).
THE REPORT OF THE INCIDENT IN WHICH PETITIONER WAS INJURED DID NOT PROVIDE THE CITY DEFENDANTS WITH NOTICE OF A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE INJURIES AND ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS; THEREFORE THE CITY DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THE CLAIM WITHIN 90 DAYS; IN ADDITION, IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS NOT A VALID EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM; THE PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND SERVE LATE NOTICES OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
WHETHER A DELAY IN DIAGNOSIS AFFECTED PLAINTIFF’S PROGNOSIS IS USUALLY A JURY QUESTION; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
HERE THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CORPORATE VEIL SHOULD BE PIERCED SUCH THAT THE DEFENDANT HOSPITAL WOULD BE DEEMED VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED MALPRACTICE BY A CORPORATION OWNED BY A HOSPITAL EMPLOYEE AND WHOSE OFFICE WAS IN THE HOSPITAL (SECOND DEPT).
IN A PROCEEDING SEEKING FINDINGS TO ENABLE A CHILD TO APPLY FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) THE SUBMISSION OF CERTIFIED COPIES OF BIRTH CERTIFICATES OR DEATH CERTIFICATES IS NOT REQUIRED; THE PROCEEDING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED ON THAT GROUND (SECOND DEPT).
Corporate Officer May Be Personally Liable for Torts Committed in the Performance of Corporate Duties/Criteria for Determining a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Cause of Action (Where Documentary Evidence Is Submitted) Explained
If the Accident Was Staged by the Insured, the Insurer Would Not Be Required to Cover a Party Injured In the Collision, Even If that Party Was Not Involved in the Staging
THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE ALLONGE, A SEPARATE PAPER, WAS FIRMLY ATTACHED TO THE NOTE, AS REQUIRED BY THE UCC; THEREFORE THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PROPERTY OWNER’S [EMPLOYER’S] COMMON LAW DUTY TO PROVIDE SAFE PLACE... NO RECORD DEMONSTRATING THE TRIAL JUDGE READ THE NOTES FROM THE JURY TO THE...