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INSURED NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES IN AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO SETTLE THE INSURED’S RIGHTS UNDER THE POLICY.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the plaintiff (the insured) was not entitled to attorney’s fees in an action brought to settle its rights under a policy:

This case is governed by the general rule that attorneys’ fees and other litigation expenses are “incidents of litigation” that the prevailing party may not collect “from the loser unless an award is authorized by agreement between the parties or by statute or court rule” … . Indeed, it is well established that “an insured may not recover the expenses incurred in bringing an affirmative action against an insurer to settle its rights under the policy” … . Here, there is nothing in the insurance policy that obligates defendant to reimburse or indemnify plaintiff for attorneys’ fees incurred by it in prosecuting an action to enforce the property coverage provisions of the policy, nor does plaintiff refer to any statute or a court rule authorizing its recovery of attorneys’ fees from defendant. Zelasko Constr., Inc. v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 NY Slip Op 06328, 4th Dept 9-30-16

 

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