The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the evidence that the sex offender suffered from a mental abnormality as defined in the Mental Hygiene Law was sufficient to survive petitioner’s motion for a directed verdict. The court noted that the disease or disorder attributed to the petitioner need not be a sexual disorder:
Pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law, a person is classified as a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement if that person “suffer[s] from a mental abnormality involving such a strong predisposition to commit sex offenses, and such an inability to control behavior, that the person is likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility” (§ 10.03 [e]). The statute defines a mental abnormality as “a congenital or acquired condition, disease or disorder that affects the emotional, cognitive, or volitional capacity of a person in a manner that predisposes him or her to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense and that results in that person having serious difficulty in controlling such conduct” (§ 10.03 [i]). “Section 10.03 (i)’s language congenital or acquired condition, disease or disorder’ is not limited to solely sexual disorders . . . Rather, one may possess a condition, disease or disorder’ that does not constitute a sexual disorder’ but nonetheless affects the emotional, cognitive, or volitional capacity of a person in a manner that predisposes him or her to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense’ ” … .
Here, the court relied on Matter of State of New York v Donald DD. (24 NY3d 174) in concluding that, while petitioner’s antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and psychopathic traits predisposed him to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense, such disorder and traits, alone or in combination, are not sexual disorders and thus as a matter of law do not constitute a mental abnormality within the meaning of the Mental Hygiene Law. We conclude, however, that the court erred in granting petitioner’s motion for a directed verdict inasmuch as “Donald DD. did not engraft upon the condition, disease, or disorder’ prong a requirement that the condition, disease or disorder’ must constitute a sexual disorder’ ” … . Matter of Suggs v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 06289, 4th Dept 9-30-16
MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (TO JUSTIFY CIVIL CONFINEMENT, THE DISEASE OR DISORDER ATTRIBUTED TO A SEX OFFENDER NEED NOT BE A SEXUAL DISORDER; SEX OFFENDER’S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SEX OFFENDERS (TO JUSTIFY CIVIL CONFINEMENT, THE DISEASE OR DISORDER ATTRIBUTED TO A SEX OFFENDER NEED NOT BE A SEXUAL DISORDER; SEX OFFENDER’S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CIVIL CONFINEMENT (SEX OFFENDERS, MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, TO JUSTIFY CIVIL CONFINEMENT, THE DISEASE OR DISORDER ATTRIBUTED TO A SEX OFFENDER NEED NOT BE A SEXUAL DISORDER; SEX OFFENDER’S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)