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QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.

The Second Department determined defendant’s statements in connection with a murder charge were made in violation of his right to counsel. A new trial was ordered. At the time defendant was questioned about a robbery and a murder (the “gas station shooting”), he was represented on a marijuana charge. The robbery and murder occurred at different times and places, but defendant allegedly was the getaway driver for both. The trial court ruled the statements related to the robbery were made in violation of defendant’s right to counsel but the statements related to the murder were admissible. The Second Department noted that it is statutorily prohibited from revisiting the trial court’s suppression of the robbery statements. Since the Second Department concluded that the robbery and murder interrogations were necessarily intertwined, the murder statements should have been suppressed:

The Court of Appeals has recognized two categories of cases in which the attachment of counsel on one crime may preclude the police from interrogating a suspect on the subject of another crime. In People v Cohen (90 NY2d 632), the Court of Appeals stated that “where the two criminal matters are so closely related transactionally, or in space or time, that questioning on the unrepresented matter would all but inevitably elicit incriminating responses regarding the matter in which there had been an entry of counsel[,] . . . interrogation on the unrepresented crime is prohibited even in the absence of direct questioning regarding the crime on which counsel had appeared” … . With respect to the second category, the Court of Appeals has stated that “a statement may be subject to suppression where impermissible questioning on a represented charge was, when viewed as an integrated whole, not fairly separable from otherwise permissible questioning on the unrepresented matter and was, in fact, purposely exploited to aid in securing inculpatory admissions on the [unrepresented matter]” … . * * *

In light of the determination that the defendant’s right to counsel was violated when he was questioned with regard to the robbery charges, we further find that his right to counsel was violated by questioning on the factually interwoven homicide matter. Indeed, the robbery and the murder cases were so closely related that questioning about the gas station shooting “would all but inevitably elicit incriminating responses regarding” the robbery … . People v Henry, 2016 NY Slip Op 07676, 2nd Dept 11-16-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/SUPPRESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (CRIMINAL LAW, QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT, WHO WAS REPRESENTED ON ANOTHER CHARGE, VIOLATED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)

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