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COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED PLAINTIFF WIFE $25,000 AS AN INTEREST IN HER HUSBAND’S MBA DEGREE; MARITAL ASSETS WERE USED TO PROCURE THE DEGREE AND THE COST OF THE DEGREE IS NOT A PROPER BASIS FOR SUCH AN AWARD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff wife in this divorce action should not have been awarded $25,000 for her interest in her husband’s MBA degree:

At the time that this action was commenced, an academic degree earned during a marriage constituted marital property subject to equitable distribution ( … cf. Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][d][7]). The value of a degree is measured by the present value of the enhanced earning capacity which it affords the holder … . The nontitled spouse is required to establish the value of the enhanced earning capacity and demonstrate that the nontitled spouse made a substantial contribution to the acquisition of the degree … . Here, the Supreme Court awarded the plaintiff $25,000, not based on the value of the defendant’s enhanced earning capacity, but rather on its determination of the cost of the acquisition of the MBA degree. The utilization of marital funds for the acquisition of the defendant’s MBA degree was a choice made by the parties during the course of the marriage that should not be second-guessed once the marriage has ended … . Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish the actual value of the defendant’s enhanced earning capacity … , and the court declined to award the defendant any distribution of the plaintiff’s master’s degree, which was also earned during the marriage. Accordingly, we modify the judgment by deleting the provision awarding the plaintiff $25,000 as and for her interest in the defendant’s MBA degree. Ospina-Cherner v Cherner, 2019 NY Slip Op 09276, Second Dept 12-24-19

 

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FATHER’S PETITION FOR SOLE CUSTODY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED ABSENT... PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304,...