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DEFENDANT, AT THE PLEA PROCEEDINGS, WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION TO BE IMPOSED OR THE MAXIMUM WHICH COULD BE IMPOSED; GUILTY PLEA VACATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, noted County Court did not specify the period of postrelease supervision which would be imposed, or the maximum which could be imposed at the plea proceedings:

“‘[A] trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences'” … . “To meet due process requirements, a defendant ‘must be aware of the postrelease supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action'” … , and “[w]ithout such procedures, vacatur of the plea is required” … . It is not enough for a court to generally inform a defendant that a term of postrelease supervision will be imposed as a part of the sentence … . Rather, for a plea of guilty to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the court must inform the defendant of either the specific period of postrelease supervision that will be imposed or, at the least, the maximum potential duration of postrelease supervision that may be imposed … .

Here, at the plea proceeding, the County Court did not specify the period of postrelease supervision to be imposed or, alternatively, the maximum potential duration of postrelease supervision that could be imposed. The court’s failure to so advise the defendant prevented his plea from being knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. People v Cabrera, 2020 NY Slip Op 08074, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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