You are here: / / COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS...

COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS SUBROGATION ACTION.

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court erred when it refused to apply the “made whole” rule in this subrogation action. After settling for the full amount of the policy, respondent insurer sought the full amount paid to plaintiff by another insurer. The matter was sent back because it was unclear whether the settlement made plaintiff whole:

Plaintiff contends that, under the “made whole” rule, respondent has no right of subrogation because plaintiff’s damages exceed the amount of the settlement. By way of background, the “made whole” rule provides that, if “the sources of recovery ultimately available are inadequate to fully compensate the insured for its losses, then the insurer—who has been paid by the insured to assume the risk of loss—has no right to share in the proceeds of the insured’s recovery from the tortfeasor” … . “In other words, the insurer may seek subrogation against only those funds and assets that remain after the insured has been compensated. This designation of priority interests . . . assures that the injured party’s claim against the tortfeasor takes precedence over the subrogation rights of the insurer” … . Although we agree with plaintiff that the court erred in refusing to apply that rule, on this record, it is unclear whether the settlement made plaintiff whole. Grinage v Durawa, 2016 NY Slip Op 07429, 4th Dept 11-10-16

INSURANCE LAW (COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS SUBROGATION ACTION)/MADE WHOLE RULE (INSURANCE LAW, COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS SUBROGATION ACTION)/SUBROGATION (INSURANCE LAW, COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS SUBROGATION ACTION)

You might also like
ALTHOUGH THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION WAS PROPERLY IMPOSED, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE REQUIRED THE POSTING OF AN UNDERTAKING (FOURTH DEPT).
Competency of Evidence Before Grand Jury Not Reviewable On Appeal Where Defendant Convicted Upon Legally Sufficient Trial Evidence
EVEN THOUGH THE WRONG CORPORATION WAS NAMED IN THE CONTRACT DEFENDANT SIGNED AS PRESIDENT, DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENSE COUNSEL’S LACK OF PREPARATION AND FAILURE TO LIMIT MOLINEUX EVIDENCE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT). ​
LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION STEMMING FROM EYE INJURY ASSOCIATED WITH USE OF A NAIL GUN PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE RENDERED THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION TIMELY, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).
INFANT CAN BE LIABLE FOR INJURY CAUSED BY A DOG OWNED BY HIS FATHER; PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM PROPERLY SURVIVED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SCAFFOLD WAS AN ADEQUATE SAFETY DEVICE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FATHER DID NOT ABUSE THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE PROHIBITED... PLAINTIFF’S MOTION PAPERS RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER HIS FAILURE...