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PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff’s (PennyMac’s) motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted. Plaintiff did not present sufficient proof of compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304:

… [A]lthough Somarriba and Carras-Gomez “stated in [their] affidavit[s] that the RPAPL 1304 notices were mailed by certified and regular first-class mail, and attached copies of those notices, the plaintiff failed to attach, as exhibits to the motion, any documents to prove that the mailing actually happened” … . Instead, the plaintiff submitted a certificate of bulk mailing, which did not identify any particular mailing, and two internal reports generated by the plaintiff, which appear to demonstrate that some unidentified pieces of mail were sent to the borrower’s address … . Additionally, no foundation was laid for the admission of these business records, as neither Somarriba nor Carras-Gomez attested that they had personal knowledge of the plaintiff’s business practices and procedures, or that the plaintiff’s records were incorporated into PennyMac’s own records or routinely relied upon by PennyMac in its business … . Finally, the plaintiff failed, alternatively, to provide proof of actual mailing of the RPAPL 1304 notice, to provide proof of “a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed, sworn to by someone with personal knowledge of the procedure” … . Neither Somarriba nor Carras-Gomez averred that they had personal knowledge of any such standard office mailing procedure of the plaintiff. PennyMac Corp. v Khan, 2019 NY Slip Op 09278, Second Dept 12-24-19

 

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