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PROSECUTOR’S UNTRUE CLAIM, MADE IN SUMMATION, THAT DEFENDANT’S DNA WAS FOUND ON THE WEAPON USED IN THE SHOOTING REQUIRED REVERSAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined that the prosecutor’s untrue claim, made in summation and immediately objected to, that defendant’s DNA was found on the weapon used to shoot the victim, required a new trial:

… [T]he prosecutor’s comments during summation that the defendant’s DNA was found on the weapon used to shoot the victim had no evidentiary support in the record. The remarks, which were promptly objected to by defense counsel, were highly prejudicial and ultimately deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial … , particularly as the Supreme Court refused to give any curative instruction or grant a mistrial based upon the prosecutor’s improper comments. People v Day, 2019 NY Slip Op 08858, Second Dept 12-11-19

 

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