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CO-OP DISCRIMINATED AGAINST THE DISABLED COMPLAINANT BY REFUSING TO ALLOW HER TO KEEP A DOG IN HER APARTMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the Commissioner of the NYS Division of Human Rights had properly found the co-op discriminated against complainant (Hough) by refusing to allow her to keep a dog in her apartment:

To establish that a violation of the Human Rights Law occurred and that a reasonable accommodation should have been made, Hough was required to demonstrate that she is disabled, that she is otherwise qualified for the tenancy, that because of her disability it is necessary for her to keep a dog in order for her to use and enjoy the apartment, and that reasonable accommodations could be made to allow her to keep a dog … . The term disability, as defined by Executive Law § 292(21), means “(a) a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques or (b) a record of such an impairment or (c) a condition regarded by others as such an impairment.”

Here, there was substantial evidence in the record to conclude that Hough suffered from generalized anxiety disorder, an impairment demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, and that she required the use of a companion dog to use and enjoy her apartment. There is sufficient evidence that having a dog would affirmatively enhance Hough’s quality of life by ameliorating the effects of her disability, thus demonstrating necessity within the meaning of the Human Rights Law … . Matter of 1 Toms Point Lane Corp. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 2019 NY Slip Op 07392, Second Dept 10-16-19

 

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