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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REQUIRED DEFENSE COUNSEL TO SEEK COURT APPROVAL BEFORE ALLOWING INVESTIGATORS OR OTHER EMPLOYEES ACCESS TO RECORDINGS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should not have required that defense counsel seek court approval before allowing investigators or other employees access to recordings:

Pursuant to CPL 245.70(6), a party who has unsuccessfully sought, or opposed the granting of, a protective order relating to the name, address, contact information, or statements of a person may obtain expedited review by an individual justice of the intermediate appellate court to which an appeal from a judgment of conviction would be taken. Where, as here, “the issue involves balancing the defendant’s interest in obtaining information for defense purposes against concerns for witness safety and protection, the question is appropriately framed as whether the determination made by the trial court was a provident exercise of discretion” … .

Applying the factors set forth in CPL 245.70(4), including concerns for witness safety and protection, I conclude that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in requiring defense counsel to seek approval of the court before exhibiting the subject recordings to investigators or others employed by counsel. Under the particular circumstances of this case, the court should have permitted defense counsel to disclose the recordings to those employed by counsel or appointed to assist in the defense, without prior approval from the Supreme Court … . People v Clarke, 2020 NY Slip Op 05221, Second Dept 9-30-20

 

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