You are here: / / THE ROBBERY VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT IN A PHOTO ARRAY...
,

THE ROBBERY VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT IN A PHOTO ARRAY AFTER THE POLICE HAD SHOWN THE ROBBERY VICTIM A CELL PHONE PHOTO DEPICTING THE DEFENDANT USING A TASER ON SOMEONE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, THE ROBBER HAD THREATENED THE VICTIM WITH A TASER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction for one of two robberies charged in the indictment, determined the pretrial identification of the defendant by the robbery victim, Fisher, should have been suppressed. The police were given a cell phone found at the robbery scene. The robber had used a Taser in the Fisher robbery. In the cell phone was a photo of a man using a Taser on a person. Fisher told the police the man in the photo using a Taser was the man who robbed him. Fisher subsequently identified the defendant in a photo array. Even though Fisher’s in-court identification of defendant was deemed admissible, the suppression error was not harmless:

… [T]he procedure employed by the detective in showing Fisher the cell phone videos was a police-arranged identification procedure, even though the police did not arrange the content of the videos on the phone. The procedure by which Fisher viewed the videos occurred at the “deliberate direction of the State,” and not as a result of mere happenstance … . The People failed to meet their initial burden of establishing the reasonableness of the police conduct and the lack of any undue suggestiveness created by the video identification procedure. By showing Fisher the cell phone and telling him that the phone was recovered from the scene of the robbery, the detective suggested that the phone may belong to one of the perpetrators of the robbery. One of the videos portrayed an individual using a taser on someone else, which was similar to Fisher’s description of the circumstances of the robbery. Fisher identified the defendant’s photograph in a photo array only after he was shown the video. Further, contrary to the People’s contention, it cannot be said that the video did not single out or portray the individual with the taser in a negative light. The video portrayed the individual committing a violent criminal act against another person … . Accordingly, the court should have suppressed the video identification on the ground that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive. People v Jones, 2019 NY Slip Op 04966, Second Dept 6-19-19

 

You might also like
Petitioner Sufficiently Alleged She Is a Nonmarital Child of the Decedent—Probate Decree Properly Vacated
School District Did Not Owe Special Duty to Plaintiff Injured in Fight After Hours on School Grounds; Failure to Lock Gate Not Proximate Cause of Injury
ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO BE CROSS-EXAMINED ABOUT A PRIOR ROBBERY WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF A PENDING APPEAL WAS ERROR, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT DRIVER HAD THE BURDEN TO PROVE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE; DEFENDANT FAILED TO ELIMINATE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER HE WAS TRAVELLING TOO FAST AND WHETHER HE KEPT A PROPER LOOKOUT FOR PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
HERE THE CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE MOUND OF SNOW AND ICE WHERE PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY SLIPPED AND FELL, WHICH ORDINARILY WOULD SUPPORT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE CITY; HOWEVER PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CITY CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION BY PLOWING, AN EXCEPTION TO THE WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT).
ARBITRATION AWARD BY A RABBINICAL COURT IN THIS DIVORCE PROCEEDING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED, FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW DID NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY, UNCONSCIONABILITY IS NOT A STATUTORY GROUND FOR VACATING AN ARBITRATION AWARD (SECOND DEPT).
COURT NEVER RULED ON WHETHER THE PROSECUTOR’S INITIAL REASON FOR EXCLUDING AN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POTENTIAL JUROR WAS A CREDIBLE RACE-NEUTRAL REASON, THE REASONS OFFERED AFTER THE JUROR WAS QUESTIONED FURTHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE COULD SUE FOR DECEDENT’S CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING BUT, BECAUSE THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION HAD NOT BEEN LISTED AS AN ASSET IN THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING, THE ADMINISTRATOR DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO SUE ON BEHALF OF THE DISTRIUBUTEE FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANTS DID NOT SHOW THERE WAS A COMPELLING NEED FOR DISCOVERY OF ‘ALCOHOL/DRUG... THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE POLICE OFFICER DEFENDANT PUNCHED WAS ENGAGED IN...