You are here: / / INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION WHICH REFERRED TO THE REQUIREMENT THAT A ‘DESIGNATED...

INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION WHICH REFERRED TO THE REQUIREMENT THAT A ‘DESIGNATED PERSON’ OPERATE A POWER BUGGY IS SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO SUPPORT A LABOR LAW 241 (6) CLAIM, PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A POWER BUGGY OPERATED BY SOMEONE WHO WAS NOT A ‘DESIGNATED PERSON’ (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Singh, over a two-justice dissent, determined that an Industrial Code provision requiring that a power buggy be operated by a “designated person” was specific enough to support a Labor Law 241 (6) claim. Plaintiff was injured when he was struck in the back by a power buggy operated by someone who was horsing around and fell off the buggy before it struck plaintiff. The First Department searched the record and awarded summary judgment to the plaintiff:

We agree with the dissent that the regulation’s requirement that a “trained and competent operator . . . shall” operate the power buggy is general, as it lacks a specific requirement or standard of conduct. However, since the term “designated person” has been held to be specific, 12 NYCRR 23-9.9(a) is a proper predicate for a claim under Labor Law § 241(6).

The dissent’s concern that we are exposing a defendant to liability for injury caused by a power buggy operated by an unauthorized person is misplaced … . We note that the Court of Appeals has reiterated that, while the duty imposed by Labor Law § 241(6) may be “onerous[,] . . . it is one the Legislature quite reasonably deemed necessary by reason of the exceptional dangers inherent in connection with constructing or demolishing buildings or doing any excavating in connection therewith'” … , and that “[t]he Industrial Code should be sensibly interpreted and applied to effectuate its purpose of protecting construction laborers against hazards in the workplace” … .

Moreover, liability under Labor Law § 241(6) “is dependent on the application of a specific Industrial Code provision and a finding that the violation of the provision was a result of negligence” … .

The fact that the operating engineer was “horse playing” prior to operating the power buggy does not absolve defendant from liability under Labor Law § 241(6) … . ​Toussaint v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2019 NY Slip Op 04302, First Dept 5-30-19

 

You might also like
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL OCCURRED ON DEBRIS IN A WALKWAY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE NYCRR IN THIS LABOR LAW 241(6) ACTION, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE FALL OCCURRED OUTSIDE THE ENTRANCE TO A SHANTY, THE NYCRR PROVISION WHICH PERTAINS TO PASSAGEWAYS WAS NOT APPLICABLE (FIRST DEPT).
WHERE THERE IS A WRITTEN CONTRACT, AN ACTION FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT WILL NOT LIE AGAINST THIRD-PARTY NONSIGNATORIES (FIRST DEPT).
MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING DESPITE WITNESS RECANTATIONS AND CONFESSION BY ANOTHER PARTY, CRITERIA FOR SHOWING OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXPLAINED.
PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A SCAFFOLD WHICH HAD NO RAILINGS, PLAINTIFF DID NOT NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THE SCAFFOLD WAS DEFECTIVE, PLAINTIFF PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
VIOLATION OF A TEMPORARY ORDER OF PROTECTION IS A VALID GROUND FOR ISSUANCE OF A FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION; EXPIRATION OF AN ORDER OF PROTECTION DOES NOT RENDER AN APPEAL MOOT.
THE “INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE,” WHICH ADDRESSES RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN A COMPANY AND ITS DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS, APPLIES TO THE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS AT THE TIME OF THE CONDUCT ALLEGED IN THE LAWSUIT, NOT AT THE TIME THE LAWSUIT WAS BROUGHT; CONTRARY AUTHORITY SHOULD NO LONGER BE FOLLOWED (FIRST DEPT). ​
NYC TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION’S RULES RE: HYBRID AND WHEELCHAIR ACCESSIBLE TAXICABS AND LIVERY VEHICLES UPHELD.
AFTER PLAINTIFF’S POST-NOTE DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR THE NONPARTY WITNESS WAS QUASHED, PLAINTIFF OBTAINED A VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FROM THE NONPARTY WITNESS; OBTAINING THE STATEMENT WAS A PROPER METHOD OF “INFORMAL DISCOVERY” (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PETITIONER DID NOT LIVE IN THE TOWN WHERE THE CHALLENGED CANDIDATE WAS RUNNING... PERSONS WHO SIGNED A DESIGNATING PETITION WHICH WAS DEEMED NULL AND VOID COULD...