You are here: / / NONSIGNATORY NOT BOUND BY ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN ENGAGEMENT LETTER (FIRST...
,

NONSIGNATORY NOT BOUND BY ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN ENGAGEMENT LETTER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, noting that Supreme Court should have decided whether a nonsignatory was bound by an arbitration clause and deciding the issue in the interest of judicial economy, determined the nonsignatory was not bound:

Millennium Lab Holdings, Inc. and Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC (Millennium Holdings, LLC), pursuant to an engagement letter, retained petitioner KPMG LLP to audit their financial statements for certain time periods. The engagement letter contained a clause requiring arbitration of “[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this Engagement Letter or the services provided hereunder.” * * *

The parties agree that the only theory under which respondent, as a nonsignatory to the engagement letter containing the arbitration clause, can be required to arbitrate is on the equitable estoppel/direct benefits grounds. We find that petitioner has not met its “heavy burden” … under that theory.

The benefits that the investors whose interests respondent represents derived from the engagement letters between petitioner and nonparty Millennium were “merely indirect” … . Here … respondent pleaded solely common-law claims and did not invoke the engagement letter … . …

Millennium and petitioner did not contemplate that the investors represented by respondent would benefit from the engagement letter. …

… [T]here is no indication in the record that the investors whom respondent represents had actual knowledge of the engagement letters between petitioner and Millennium … . Matter of KPMG LLP v Kirschner, 2020 NY Slip Op 02286, First Dept 4-16-20

 

You might also like
DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT IN A POLICE REPORT ACKNOWLEDGING FAILURE TO STOP AT RED LIGHT WAS AN ADMISSION, CONFLICTING STATEMENT MADE LATER PRESENTED ONLY A FEIGNED ISSUE OF FACT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF (FIRST DEPT).
No Justification for Handcuffing Defendant/Handcuffing Constituted an Arrest Before Officer Had Probable Cause to Arrest
DEFENDANT POLICE OFFICER WAS ENGAGED IN AN “EMERGENCY OPERATION” WITHIN THE MEANING OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1104 WHEN HIS POLICE VAN STRUCK PLAINTIFF AS SHE STEPPED INTO THE ROAD FROM BETWEEN PARKED CARS; DEFENDANT DID NOT ACT WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS AND, THEREFORE, COULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES (FIRST DEPT).
AN ADOPTIVE PARENT MAY BE EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THAT HER FORMER SAME-SEX PARTNER, WITH WHOM SHE HAD AN AGREEMENT TO ADOPT A CHILD, HAS STANDING TO SEEK JOINT CUSTODY, MATTER REMITTED FOR PRESENTING EVIDENCE ON AND CONSIDERATION OF THAT ISSUE (FIRST DEPT).
NO EVIDENCE ROBBERY VICTIM SAW A FIREARM, ROBBERY FIRST CONVICTION VACATED (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY AN AIR CONDITIONER WHEN TWO OF THE FOUR RODS ATTACHING THE AIR CONDITIONER TO THE CEILING DETACHED AND ONE END OF THE UNIT FELL; QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE AIR CONDITIONER WAS A FALLING OBJECT WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN SECURED WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT).
Matter First Raised In a Reply Affirmation Is Not Properly Before an Appellate Court
Two Asbestos Cases Properly Consolidated

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

OWNER OF A SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEM INSTALLED ON SCHOOL DISTRICT PROPERTY WAS ENTITLED... SERVICES PROVIDED TO A DISABLED MAN BY THE NYS OFFICE OF PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL...