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THERE WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE DEFENDANT SHARED THE CO-DEFENDANT’S INTENT TO KILL, IN ADDITION, DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION UNDER AN ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY THEORY WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and dismissing the indictment, determined there was legally insufficient evidence that the defendant shared the co-defendant’s intent to kill, and the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The co-defendant walked up to the defendant on the street and shot him. The defendant was present at the scene and picked the co-defendant up and drove away after the shooting. The defendant was convicted under an accomplice or accessorial liability theory:

A “defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, alone, is insufficient for a finding of criminal liability” … . Indeed, evidence that a defendant was at the crime scene and even assisted the perpetrator in removing evidence of that crime is insufficient to support a defendant’s conviction where the People fail to offer evidence from which the jury could rationally exclude the possibility that the defendant was without knowledge of the perpetrator’s intent … . “An aider and abettor must share the intent or purpose of the principal actor, and there can be no partnership in an act where there is no community of purpose”… . We have no difficulty concluding that there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences by which the jury could have found that defendant intentionally aided the codefendant after the murder, but we cannot conclude that there is legally sufficient evidence to support the inference that defendant shared the codefendant’s intent to kill the victim … . The People offered no motive for the crime … , and the evidence indicating that defendant was staring at the victim 40 minutes before the shooting and that defendant may have dropped off the codefendant at the bar prior to the shooting was plainly insufficient to establish that defendant was aware of and shared the codefendant’s intent to kill the victim … . * * *

Even assuming, arguendo, that the evidence is legally sufficient, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury … , we further conclude that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence … . A review of the weight of the evidence requires us to first determine whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable … . If so, we must ” weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony’ ” … . We conclude that an acquittal would not have been unreasonable in this case and, based on the weight of the evidence, we further conclude that the jury was not justified in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Mcdonald, 2019 NY Slip Op 03494, Fourth Dept 5-3-19

 

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