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NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF-STUDENT’S INJURIES, ANOTHER STUDENT, WHO WAS BEING CHASED BY A DOG WHICH HAD BROKEN LOOSE, RAN INTO PLAINTIFF DURING LACROSSE PRACTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the plaintiff-student’s negligent supervision action against the board of education was properly dismissed. The plaintiff was injured during lacrosse practice when a dog brought into the field area by a nonstudent broke loose and chased a student who ran into plaintiff:

… [T]he defendants established …that they had no specific knowledge of any prior instances of dogs being brought into the field area during sports practices. Furthermore, the act of a student running into the infant plaintiff was a spontaneous, impulsive, and intervening act that could not have been anticipated. Therefore, the defendants established … that any alleged lack of supervision was not a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff’s injuries … . B.J. v Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 2019 NY Slip Op 03325, Second Dept 5-1-19

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THE AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDED PLAINTIFF WOULD PAY DEFENDANT ABOUT $38,500 AND PLAINTIFF WOULD BE ENTITLED TO MONTHLY PAYMENTS FROM DEFENDANT’S REVENUE TOTALING ABOUT $52,500 WAS NOT A “LOAN” TO WHICH THE USURY DEFENSE COULD BE APPLIED (SECOND DEPT).
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT IN THIS ESCALATOR ACCIDENT CASE.
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OPERATOR OF A SKATING RINK PROVIDED PROPER SUPERVISION AND THEREFORE WHETHER THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE APPLIED, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE WAS PUSHED TO THE ICE BY AN UNRULY SKATER (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE POLICE OFFICER, ANSWERING A CALL, ACTED RECKLESSLY IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT DID NOT MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE DEMONSTRATING IT LACKED CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE TEACHER’S ALLEGED PROPENSITY TO SEXUALLY ABUSE CHILDREN; THEREFORE ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED DEFENDANT FROM INTRODUCING CERTAIN EVIDENCE AT TRIAL BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS, HOWEVER, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS THE LESS-MONIED SPOUSE (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS KILLED WHEN DEFENDANT DRIVER, WHO WAS BEING CHASED BY THE POLICE DEFENDANTS, COLLIDED WITH PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S VEHICLE; THE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THE “RECKLESS DISREGARD” ACTION AGAINST THE POLICE WAS REVERSED BECAUSE OF THE OMISSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE AND THE ADMISSION OF PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
THE APPLICATION FOR A WARRANT FOR THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CELL PHONE DID NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH; THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

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