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PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS KILLED WHEN DEFENDANT DRIVER, WHO WAS BEING CHASED BY THE POLICE DEFENDANTS, COLLIDED WITH PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S VEHICLE; THE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THE “RECKLESS DISREGARD” ACTION AGAINST THE POLICE WAS REVERSED BECAUSE OF THE OMISSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE AND THE ADMISSION OF PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the defense verdict and ordering a new trial in this “reckless disregard” action against the Nassau County Police Department stemming from a fatal traffic accident during a police chase, determined several evidentiary errors deprived plaintiff’s decedent of a fair trial. The vehicle which the police were chasing, driven by defendant Daley, collided with plaintiff’s decedent’s vehicle:

Supreme Court erred in declining to admit the Nassau County Police Department Rules and Regulations (hereinafter the rules) into evidence. An officer’s alleged violation of internal guidelines, although not dispositive, may be some evidence of whether an officer acted with reckless disregard … . The court compounded this error when it charged the jury pursuant to PJI 2:79A, specifically charging the jury that it may consider the rules when determining whether the police officers acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. To the extent necessary, the rules could have been admitted with a limiting instruction that they may considered only as some evidence of recklessness, along with other factors … .

Further, the Supreme Court erred in admitting the full decision from a Dunaway/Huntley/Mapp hearing in the defendant driver’s criminal proceeding, as its subject matter was collateral and merely served to bolster the testimony of the police officers … and was therefore prejudicial. The court also erred in entirely precluding cross-examination of Detective Peter Ellison with respect to prior bad acts. Under the circumstances of this case, these errors were not harmless (see CPLR 2002), as the evidence related directly to issues to be determined by the jury … , i.e., the officers’ credibility, the nature of the police stop, and the question of when the officers activated their emergency lights. Yun v Daley, 2025 NY Slip Op 03224, Second Dept 5-28-25

Practice Point: In the “reckless disregard” action against the police stemming from a high-speed chase, the police department rules should have been admitted in evidence because a violation of the rules is some evidence of negligence.

Practice Point: Here the defendant driver who collided with plaintiff’s decedent during the police chase was charged criminally. It was prejudicial error to allow a decision in the criminal matter in evidence in this “reckless disregard” action against the police. It was also error to preclude the cross-examination of a detective about prior bad acts.

 

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