You are here: / / MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DAMAGES VERDICT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE AS...
,

MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DAMAGES VERDICT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE AS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE JURY FOUND THE INJURY TO BE PERMANENT BUT DID NOT AWARD DAMAGES FOR FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING, DAMAGES FOR PAST PAIN AND SUFFERING TOO LOW, MAY HAVE BEEN AN IMPERMISSIBLE COMPROMISE VERDICT (SECOND DEPT)

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court and granting a new trial, determined the jury’s damages verdict in this rear-end collision, traffic accident case should have been granted. The jury found that plaintiff suffered a permanent injury but did not award plaintiff with damages for future pain and suffering. The Second Department further determined the $12,500 verdict for past pain and suffering was too low:

A jury verdict should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence only if the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence… . Here, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff’s motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict on the issue of damages for past pain and suffering and future pain and suffering, as the verdict with respect to those damages was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The jury’s determination that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages for future pain and suffering was inconsistent with the jury’s finding that his injuries were permanent in nature and were proximately caused by the accident … . Furthermore, whereas the jury was presented with conflicting evidence and theories as to the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and the jury’s award for past pain and suffering was inexplicably low, it appears that the verdict with respect to damages for past pain and suffering may have been the result of an impermissible compromise … . Avissato v McDaniel, 2019 NY Slip Op 00084, Second Dept 1-9-19

 

You might also like
A PARTY’S FAILURE TO EXECUTE A MEMORANDUM OF A PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT RENDERED THE MEMORANDUM IMPROPERLY RECORDED AND FAILED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO A CLAIM TO THE PROPERTY.
DEFENDANT DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR VACATION OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER EITHER CPLR 5015 OR 317; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).
THE DEFENDANT SCHOOL DID NOT ELIMINATE TRIABLE QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER IT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE TEACHER’S ABUSIVE PROPENSITIES; THE NEGLIGENT HIRING AND NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSES OF ACTION IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
AFTER A DIVORCE PLAINTIFF SUED THE EX-WIFE AND HER ATTORNEYS ALLEGING FALSE ARREST, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND VIOLATION OF JUDICIARY LAW 487; THOSE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
PRIMARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK PRECLUDED RECOVERY FOR INJURY DURING GYM CLASS, INHERENT COMPULSION DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE (SECOND DEPT).
THE FACT THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS THE ONLY PERSON WHO HEARD A PROSECUTION WITNESS RECANT HIS IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT AS THE SHOOTER CREATED A CONFLICT OF INTEREST, PEOPLE’S APPLICATION TO RELIEVE DEFENSE COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE NEW YORK TRANSIT AUTHORITY (AS OPPOSED TO THE CITY OF NEW YORK) IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, AND THE FAILURE TO APPLY FOR PERMISSION TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM, GAVE RISE TO THIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND JUDICIARY LAW 487 ACTION WHICH SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TWO CAUSES OF ACTION EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE ANY SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND THEREFORE WAS NOT LIABLE FOR AN INJURY ARISING FROM THE MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK FOR A SUBCONTRACTOR; LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DISCIPLINARY DETERMINATION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (SECOND... AWARDING FATHER SOLE LEGAL CUSTODY DID NOT HAVE A SOUND AND SUBSTANTIAL BASIS...