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PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO FORECLOSE ON THE REVERSE MORTGAGE WITH EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff bank did not demonstrate standing to foreclose on the reverse mortgage. The evidence submitted did not meet the requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule:

… [T]he plaintiff submitted, among other things, the affidavit of Stephen Craycroft, an assistant secretary of Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, who attested that the plaintiff was in possession of the note at the time of the commencement of this action. However, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the admissibility of the records relied upon by Craycroft under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518[a]), since Craycroft did not clearly attest that he was personally familiar with the plaintiff’s record-keeping practices and procedures … . Inasmuch as the plaintiff’s cross motion was based on evidence that was not in admissible form, the plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … .

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the copy of the note annexed to the summons and complaint was insufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, its standing to commence the action, since the note bore a specific endorsement to an entity other than the plaintiff … . Nationstar HECM Acquisition Trust 2015-2 v Andrews, 2018 NY Slip Op 08944, Second Dept 12-26-18

 

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