You are here: / / QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMERGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO REAR-END COLLIS...

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMERGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO REAR-END COLLISION.

The First Department determined a question of fact about the applicability of the emergency doctrine precluded summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff in this rear-end collision case. Plaintiff's car was stopped because of a flat tire. Defendant alleged he did not see plaintiff's car because his line of sight was blocked by a car in front which merged left just prior to the collision:

Although there is a presumption of liability based upon the rear-end collision (see Francisco v Schoepfer, 30 AD3d 275 [1st Dept 2006]), questions of fact exist as to whether the emergency doctrine applies so as to provide defendant with a reasonable excuse for the collision. Such issues include whether plaintiff's hazard lights were flashing, whether defendant maintained a safe distance behind the car driving in front of him, and whether under the circumstances defendant acted reasonably to avoid the collision … . Gonzalez v Marescot, 2016 NY Slip Op 04105, 1st Dept 5-26-16

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMERGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO REAR-END COLLISION)/REAR-END COLLISION (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMERGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO REAR-END COLLISION)/EMERGENCY DOCTRINE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMERGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO REAR-END COLLISION)

You might also like
ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT NEW YORK COMPANY IS A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF AN ISRAELI COMPANY, THE TWO ENTITIES OPERATED INDEPENDENTLY SUCH THAT NEW YORK COULD NOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER THE ISRAELI COMPANY, A QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE RE DEFAMATORY REMARKS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY DEFENDANT DOES NOT INSULATE THE DEFENDANT FROM A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON BREACH OF A CONTRACTUAL NON-DISPARAGEMENT CLAUSE (FIRST DEPT).
THIRD-DEGREE POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (PENAL LAW 220.16 (12)) IS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THIRD-DEGREE POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (PENAL LAW 220.16 (1)); GUILTY PLEA VACACTED (FIRST DEPT).
Plaintiff Unable to Prove Actual Malice—Summary Judgment to Defendant
PLAINTIFF LANDLORD WAS NOT ABLE TO SHOW THE FULLY EXECUTED LEASE WAS EVER DELIVERED TO DEFENDANT TENANT; THEREFORE THE LANDLORD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE TERMS OF THE LEASE (FIRST DEPT). ​
Even If Information About Prosecution Witness’ Recent Drug Sales Had Been Withheld in Violation of Brady/Giglio, the Withheld Information Was Not “Material” In That It Would Not Have Affected the Outcome
HUSBAND ENTITLED TO REVOKE HIS CONSENT TO USE OF A FROZEN EMBRYO, EMBRYO AWARDED TO HUSBAND FOR SOLE PURPOSE OF DISPOSAL IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
ARBITRATOR’S DETERMINATION THAT THE ACKNOWLEDGED SEXUAL HARASSMENT DID NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF A DISCHARGEABLE OFFENSE VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY AND WAS IRRATIONAL (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF FELL THROUGH AN UNGUARDED STAIRWAY OPENING AND WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION; DEFENDANTS DID NOT SHOW THAT THE PRE-DEPOSITION SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS PREMATURE (FIRST DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT COUPLED WITH HER AFFIDAVIT RAISED A QUESTION OF... DISABLED, ILL DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO APPEAR REMOTELY BY VIDEO...