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DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MEET 60-DAY DEADLINE IMPOSED BY A LOCAL COURT RULE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT DOES NOT APPLY TO FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, over an extensive dissent, determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed defendants’ motions for summary judgment in this medical malpractice. The motions were dismissed on procedural grounds because they were filed and served a few days after the 60-day deadline imposed by the local court rules. The courts had been closed when the papers were supposed to be filed due to a storm. The 2nd Department went on to determine the merits. Plaintiff had experienced headaches over a period of years and had sought treatment for them. Eventually a benign brain tumor was discovered. In removing the tumor plaintiff was rendered legally blind. The malpractice action alleged a negligent failure to diagnose the tumor, and lack of informed consent. The court held that the continuing treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limitations even though the treatment was for headaches, not the tumor, because the presence of the tumor had not been diagnosed. The court went on to find that the informed consent cause of action was not viable because the alleged malpractice was a failure to diagnose, not the negligent performance of a surgical procedure:

… [T]he record presents issues of fact as to continuous treatment. As is well established, “the continuous treatment doctrine tolls the Statute of Limitations for a medical malpractice action when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint” … . In addition, “[w]here the malpractice claim is based on an alleged failure to properly diagnose a condition, the continuous treatment doctrine may apply as long as the symptoms being treated indicate the presence of that condition” … . * * *

… [T]he informed consent claim lacks merit. As we have held, “[a] failure to diagnose cannot be the basis of a cause of action for lack of informed consent unless associated with a diagnostic procedure that involve[s] invasion or disruption of the integrity of the body'” … . Lewis v Rutkovsky, 2017 NY Slip Op 06342, First Dept 8-29-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MEET 60-DAY DEADLINE IMPOSED BY A LOCAL COURT RULE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION, LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT DOES NOT APPLY TO FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE (FIRST DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MEET 60-DAY DEADLINE IMPOSED BY A LOCAL COURT RULE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION, LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT DOES NOT APPLY TO FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE (FIRST DEPT))/CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE  (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MEET 60-DAY DEADLINE IMPOSED BY A LOCAL COURT RULE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION, LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT DOES NOT APPLY TO FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE (FIRST DEPT))/INFORMED CONSENT  (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MEET 60-DAY DEADLINE IMPOSED BY A LOCAL COURT RULE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION, LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT DOES NOT APPLY TO FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MEET 60-DAY DEADLINE IMPOSED BY A LOCAL COURT RULE (FIRST DEPT))

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