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INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED DURING RECESS WHEN, PLAYING FOOTBALL OUTSIDE THE DESIGNATED FOOTBALL AREA, HE DOVE FOR THE BALL AND STRUCK A PIECE OF PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT, THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the school district’s motion for summary judgment in this negligent supervision, student injury case should not have been granted. Infant plaintiff was playing touch football during recess in a designated area near the playground. The student was injured when, outside the designated area, he dove to catch the ball and struck a piece of playground equipment:

… [T]he defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of demonstrating that the risk of colliding into the playground equipment located near the edge of the field was inherent in the activity of playing touch football on the field. Although the risks inherent in a sport include those “associated with the construction of the playing surface and any open and obvious condition on it” … , the playground equipment was not a part of the football field or related to the game… . Accordingly, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that their alleged negligent supervision in permitting the students to play football near the playground did not “create[ ] a dangerous condition over and above the usual dangers that are inherent in the sport” … . In addition, while the infant plaintiff was a willing participant in the game, in light of his age, it cannot presently be determined as a matter of law that he was aware of and appreciated the risks involved in the activity in which he was engaged … .

Further, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the infant plaintiff’s accident occurred in so short a span of time that even the most intense supervision could not have prevented it, thereby negating any alleged lack of supervision as the proximate cause of the infant plaintiff’s injuries … . Rather, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the infant plaintiff “was participating in a prohibited activity for an extended period of time and more intense supervision may have prevented the accident” … . M.P. v Mineola Union Free Sch. Dist., 2018 NY Slip Op 08119, Second Dept 11-28-18

NEGLIGENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED DURING RECESS WHEN, PLAYING FOOTBALL OUTSIDE THE DESIGNATED FOOTBALL AREA, HE DOVE FOR THE BALL AND STRUCK A PIECE OF PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT, THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED DURING RECESS WHEN, PLAYING FOOTBALL OUTSIDE THE DESIGNATED FOOTBALL AREA, HE DOVE FOR THE BALL AND STRUCK A PIECE OF PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT, THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED DURING RECESS WHEN, PLAYING FOOTBALL OUTSIDE THE DESIGNATED FOOTBALL AREA, HE DOVE FOR THE BALL AND STRUCK A PIECE OF PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT, THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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