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THE BANK’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1303 AND 1304 WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO THE BANK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff bank’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted in this foreclosure action. There was a question of fact whether plaintiff complied with the notice requirements of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1303, and plaintiff did not establish it complied with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304:

… [D]efendant raised a triable issue of fact with respect to whether the RPAPL 1303 notice was in the proper form, as he asserted in his affidavit that the notice with which he was served “was on white colored paper, the same color papers as the summons and complaint and the heading entitled Help for Homeowners in Foreclosure’ was smaller than twenty-point type” … .

… [T]he affidavit of Lorene Alford Marsh, an Assistant Vice President of the plaintiff, was insufficient to establish that the notice was sent to the defendant in the manner required by RPAPL 1304. Although Marsh attested that the 90-day notices of default were sent to the defendant by certified mail and first-class mail on March 8, 2013, and attached copies of those notices, the plaintiff failed to attach, as exhibits to the motion, any documents to prove that the mailings actually occurred … . Nor did Marsh attest that she had personal knowledge of the mailing practices of her employer at the time the RPAPL 1304 notices allegedly were sent. Instead, she merely stated that she had personal knowledge of the plaintiff’s procedures for creating and maintaining notices mailed in connection with the loan. Moreover, rather than establish proof of a standard office practice and procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed, Marsh, in her affidavit, merely described the mailing requirements listed in the statute … . Bank of Am., N.A. v Lauro, 2020 NY Slip Op 04531, Second Dept 8-19-20

 

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