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SIDEWALK WAS NOT USED AS A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT IN THIS ASSAULT CASE.

The Second Department determined, under the facts, the sidewalk was not “used” as a dangerous instrument by the defendant. The defendant punched the victim who then fell and struck his head on the sidewalk, suffering very serious injury. Although it is possible to intentionally or recklessly “use” a sidewalk as a dangerous instrument, here the sidewalk was not “used” by the defendant to cause injury withn the meaning of the assault statute (Penal Law 120.05(4)):

We agree with the People's interpretation of Penal Law § 120.05(4) that the reckless mens rea must be read to modify the phrase “by means of . . . a dangerous instrument” (see Penal Law § 15.05[3]), and that the statute does not, as the Supreme Court held, require “purposeful use” of the dangerous instrument (see Penal Law § 15.15[1]…). However, we disagree with the People's contention that Penal Law § 120.05(4) does not require that the serious physical injury be recklessly caused by the use of a dangerous instrument. Such a reading of the statute ignores the definition of dangerous instrument, which expressly focuses on the circumstances in which the instrument is “used” (Penal Law § 10.00[13]), and the use-oriented approach that has evolved directly from that definition … . Moreover, a person can “use” a dangerous instrument in a reckless manner … . Therefore, a conviction under Penal Law § 120.05(4) requires legally sufficient evidence establishing that the defendant recklessly “used” the dangerous instrument. People v McElroy, 2016 NY Slip Op 03897, 2nd Dept 5-18-16

CRIMINAL LAW (SIDEWALK WAS NOT USED AS A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT IN THIS ASSAULT CASE)/ASSAULT (SIDEWALK WAS NOT USED AS A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT IN THIS ASSAULT CASE)/DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT (SIDEWALK WAS NOT USED AS A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT IN THIS ASSAULT CASE)

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