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Question of Fact Raised About Owner’s Knowledge of Presence of Lead Paint

The Fourth Department determined a question of fact had been raised about whether a defendant/owner of the apartment had constructive notice of the presence of lead paint:

The deposition testimony of [defendant] was equivocal and inconsistent with respect to whether he had constructive notice of a dangerous lead paint condition on his property. For instance, Weston alternately testified that there “could have been” peeling or chipping paint, that he did not recall whether there was peeling or chipping paint, and that he had “no problem” with peeling or chipping paint. [Defendant] similarly contradicted himself as to whether he knew that a child lived in the apartment.  Regarding the other [Chapman v Silber (97 NY2d 9)] factors, [defendant] testified that he believed that he had a right to re-enter the apartment to make repairs, and he admitted that he knew by 1990 that lead was bad for children and that it could be found in houses like his. In short, [defendant’s] testimony … raised triable issues of fact regarding constructive notice … .  Watson v Priore, et al, 293, CA 12-00977, 4th Dept. 3-22-13

 

 

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