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THERE IS NO LEGAL SUPPORT FOR A ‘TRI-PARENT’ ARRANGEMENT WHERE A FORMER SAME-SEX PARTNER OF MOTHER, MOTHER AND FATHER SHARE VISITATION AND CUSTODY OF THE CHILD (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Centra, over a two-justice concurrence and a dissent, determined petitioner, the former same-sex partner of mother, did not have standing to seek custody and visitation of the child, despite mother’s support of the petition. The petitioner moved out of mother;s residence in 2010. Mother thereafter conceived a child with father. At first father wanted nothing to do with the child, but he has visited the child since 2014. Petitioner participated in the birth and naming of the child and assumed the role of a parent, but the romantic relationship with mother ended in 2012. Father opposed petitioner’s 2017 petition for custody and visitation. Mother did not want to terminate father’s rights. Family Court granted father’s motion to dismiss the petition. The Fourth Department affirmed finding no legal support for a “tri-parent” custody and visitation arrangement:

The wording of Domestic Relations Law § 70 (a) is clear and straightforward. It states that “either” parent may seek custody or visitation (id.). It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that “[w]ords of ordinary import used in a statute are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning” … . The common dictionary definition of “either” when used as an adjective has two senses, i.e., “being the one and the other of two” and “being the one or the other of two” … . In addition, when the Court of Appeals stated in Brooke S.B. that section 70 does not define the critical term “parent,” it added the following in a footnote: “We note that by the use of the term either,’ the plain language of Domestic Relations Law § 70 clearly limits a child to two parents, and no more than two, at any given time” (Brooke S.B., 28 NY3d at 18 n 3). In our view, the clear wording of section 70 (a), which was expressly recognized by the Court of Appeals, precludes any relief to petitioner here because there are already two parents: the mother and the father. Under section 70 (a), there simply can be no more. We are therefore in agreement with the Third Department’s recent decision determining that to allow three parents to “simultaneously have standing to seek custody . . . does not comport with the holding in Matter of Brooke S.B.” (Matter of Shanna O. v James P., 176 AD3d 1334, 1335 [3d Dept 2019]). Matter of Tomeka N.H. v Jesus R., 2020 NY Slip Op 02015, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

Similar issue and result in Matter of Wlock v King, 2020 NY Slip Op 02019, Fourth Dept 3-20-20

 

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