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THE CRIMINAL LAW DEFINITION OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY IS NOT THE STANDARD FOR ABUSE IN FAMILY COURT, THE STANDARD IS ‘CREATING A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF SERIOUS INJURY’ (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, found that the child, Talia, was abused. Family Court had determined that Talia was not abused because her injuries did not meet the definition of serious physical injury as defined in the Penal Law. The Family Court Act criteria is “creating a substantial risk of serious injury:”

We agree with the Family Court's finding that Talia's injuries were “clearly inflicted and not accidental.” However, we disagree with the court's finding that Talia was not abused based on its determination that she had not sustained a serious physical injury as defined in Penal Law § 10.00(10). Although the definition of “abuse” under Family Court Act § 1012 is similar to the definition of “serious physical injury” under the Penal Law, the definitions are not identical. The Penal Law defines “serious physical injury” as “physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss of impairment of the function of any bodily organ” (Penal Law § 10.00[10]). However, under the Family Court Act, a “child need not sustain a serious injury for a finding of abuse as long as the evidence demonstrates that the parent sufficiently endangered the child by creating a substantial risk of serious injury” … .

Here, the fracture to Talia's humerus required her arm to be immobilized for more than two weeks, which is sufficient to establish a protracted impairment of health … . In addition, the medical testimony revealed that this injury caused Talia pain and discomfort, and could take months to heal. Furthermore, there was a concern that there could be loss of function and loss of growth potential. Although this was unlikely in Talia's case, since her fracture was not completely displaced, the conduct of the mother, the father, and the maternal grandmother still created a substantial risk that such injury could have occurred … . Matter of Jonah B. (Ferida B.), 2018 NY Slip Op 06735, Second Dept 10-10-18

FAMILY LAW (THE CRIMINAL LAW DEFINITION OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY IS NOT THE STANDARD FOR ABUSE IN FAMILY COURT, THE STANDARD IS 'CREATING A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF SERIOUS INJURY' (SECOND DEPT))/ABUSE (FAMILY LAW, THE CRIMINAL LAW DEFINITION OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY IS NOT THE STANDARD FOR ABUSE IN FAMILY COURT, THE STANDARD IS 'CREATING A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF SERIOUS INJURY' (SECOND DEPT))/SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY (FAMILY LAW, THE CRIMINAL LAW DEFINITION OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY IS NOT THE STANDARD FOR ABUSE IN FAMILY COURT, THE STANDARD IS 'CREATING A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF SERIOUS INJURY' (SECOND DEPT))/CRIMINAL LAW (FAMILY LAW, ABUSE, THE CRIMINAL LAW DEFINITION OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY IS NOT THE STANDARD FOR ABUSE IN FAMILY COURT, THE STANDARD IS 'CREATING A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF SERIOUS INJURY' (SECOND DEPT))

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