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DEFENDANT’S CAR MERELY FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment should have been granted to defendant Brady in this bicycle-car collision case. Brady was parked parallel to Dunbar waiting for Dunbar to pull out of a parking space. Plaintiff rode her bicycle between the two cars and struck the door of the Dunbar car when Dunbar opened it to speak to Brady. Brady’s car was deemed not to be a proximate cause of the accident, rather the position of Brady’s car merely furnished the condition for the accident. Dunbar’s motion for summary judgment, however was properly denied:

The Supreme Court should have granted Brady’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the second supplemental complaint insofar as asserted against him. Although the issue of proximate cause is generally one for the jury … , “liability may not be imposed upon a party who merely furnished the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the event’ but was not one of its causes” … . Here, in support of his motion, Brady demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting evidence that his conduct in stopping his car while waiting for a parking space merely furnished the condition or occasion for the accident, and was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries … .

… Dunbar failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Dunbar was negligent in opening the door when it was not reasonably safe to do so, and in allegedly failing to see what, by the reasonable use of his senses, he should have seen … . Price v Tasber, 2016 NY Slip Op 08385, 2nd Dept 12-14-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT’S CAR MERELY FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/PROXIMATE CAUSEEFENDANT’S CAR MERELY FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/ BICYCLES (DEFENDANT’S CAR MERELY FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/CONDITION FOR ACCIDENT (DEFENDANT’S CAR MERELY FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE)

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